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INTRODUCTION: DIFFERENT PUBLIC HEALTH 
APPROACHES IN THE RESPONSE TO COVID-19
Over the past 6 months, we have witnessed 
diversity in the spread and severity of the 
COVID-19 and in the nature and timing of 
responses to it in different countries and 
contexts.1 Acute emergencies often mobi-
lise a short spurt of attention and resources. 
COVID-19 is, however, a protracted pandemic 
that spreads through and exacerbates socio-
economic inequalities and stresses health 
and democratic systems in a way that calls 
for sustained responses from local to global 
levels.
The ways that different governments have 
responded to COVID-19 highlight the long- 
standing tensions between different frame-
works and approaches to public health. 
Broadly characterised, one approach views 
people as rights holders who should actively 
be engaged in proactive interventions that 
address the social determinants of health, in 
a way that is respectful of rights and of collec-
tive human security. In contrast, the second 
approach sees people as the objects of reactive 
technical, biomedical ‘command- and- control’ 
interventions, with biosecurity measures to 
protect populations against harmful patho-
gens rapidly implemented alongside author-
itarian and militarised approaches when 
epidemics are seen to threaten socioeco-
nomic and political interests and security. 
Both approaches integrate knowledge and 
technology, but do so in different ways and to 
different ends. While these two frameworks 
have coexisted, contested and been applied, 
sometimes together, for over two centu-
ries, COVID-19 has exacerbated the tension 
between them. This has longer term implica-
tions for how public health is understood and 
health challenges effectively addressed.
In this piece, we highlight deficien-
cies and harms of a dominant biosecurity, 
authoritarian framing of public health. We 
argue for a comprehensive, participatory, 
inclusive public health approach that inte-
grates rights, social dimensions and diverse 
sources of knowledge, evidence and inno-
vation and that maintains equity as a critical 
goal.
The precautionary principle and limita-
tions of individual rights in the interests of 
public health and safety are well- established 
norms that go beyond public health and are 
included in constitutions and laws. When 
Summary box
 ► Global and national responses to the COVID-19 pan-
demic highlight a long- standing tension between 
biosecurity- focused, authoritarian and sometimes 
militarised approaches to public health and, in con-
trast, comprehensive, social determinants, participa-
tory and rights- based approaches.
 ► Notwithstanding principles that may limit rights in 
the interests of public health and the role of central 
measures in some circumstances, effective pub-
lic health in a protracted pandemic like COVID-19 
requires cooperation, communication, participatory 
decision- making and action that safeguards the 
Siracusa principles, respect for people’s dignity and 
local- level realities and capacities.
 ► Yet there is mounting evidence of a dominant re-
sponse to COVID-19 where decisions are being 
made and enforced in an overcentralised, non- 
transparent, top- down manner, often involving mil-
itary coercion and abuse in communities, even while 
evidence shows the long- term harm to public health 
and human rights.
 ► In contrast, experiences of comprehensive, equity- 
focused, participatory public health approaches, 
which use diverse sources of knowledge, disciplines 
and capabilities, show the type of public health ap-
proach that will be more effective to meet the 21st 
century challenges of pandemics, climate, food and 
energy crises, growing social inequality, conflict and 
other threats to health.
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the risk is high and effective population measures exist, 
such as vaccination or water treatment, decisions may be 
made centrally to ensure the most widespread protection 
of the population, especially when no equally effective 
alternatives can achieve the same population benefits. 
Central- level measures may be implemented to invest in 
technologies, guide and support local capacities or to 
ensure universal coverage. An acute emergency or rapidly 
unfolding pandemic can provoke demand for centrally 
driven prompt and wide- reaching action. However, the 
COVID-19 pandemic presents a complex case, where the 
intended and unintended impacts of measures imple-
mented at different levels are still emerging.
This protracted pandemic requires cooperation and 
effective communication between national and local 
levels, including communities, implemented in a way that 
safeguards respect for people’s dignity, supports local- 
level capacities and engages with people’s languages, 
cultures, knowledge and realities.1 2 Decisions made in 
public health require evidence from a range of disci-
plines and sciences, as well as from experiences and 
perspectives from all levels, with communication on how 
trade- offs were decided. Effective responses and simpli-
fied guidance cannot be imported from one setting to 
another without adapting them to diverse contexts in 
ways that are participatory, transparent and generate 
trust in authorities from implementers and communi-
ties.3 While the public health response is not indepen-
dent of the broader sociopolitical context, its framing 
and implementation can, however, redress inequities 
and reinforce social empowerment, cohesion, solidarity 
and human security.3 As consistently articulated by the 
United Nations (UN) and its agencies,1 collectively, we 
are only as free of risk as the most vulnerable in society. 
If public health practice reflects and does not confront 
underlying power imbalances and inequalities that 
generate risk and vulnerability, we will all be insecure. As 
a global pandemic, COVID-19 thus also requires coop-
eration, communication and solidarity across countries 
and international organisations as envisaged in the 2005 
International Health Regulations (IHR), the Sustainable 
Development Goals and the 1978 and 2018 Declarations 
on Primary Health Care.4
How will we judge the public health response to 
COVID-19? Was it rights driven, participatory, equitable, 
compassionate and based on solidarity? Were diverse 
forms of evidence and experience encouraged, made 
available and transparently considered? Was the polit-
ical, values- based ethical nature of decisions and inter-
ventions recognised? Were open dialogue, self- reflection, 
information sharing and active citizenship encouraged?
EVIDENCE OF HARMS IN AN AUTHORITARIAN BIOSECURITY 
RESPONSE
As the pandemic unfolds, hindsight will provide more 
answers to these questions. Yet in a rapidly accelerating 
COVID-19 pandemic, there is already mounting evidence 
of decisions having been made in a centralised, hectic, 
top- down manner, constraining local choice even while 
demanding local flexibility and assuming responsive-
ness of communities and health systems.1 While regional 
reports suggest that stringent responses early in the 
pandemic were associated with a lower ensuing COVID-19 
prevalence in some countries,5 longer term lockdowns, 
bans and quarantines raise challenges for already vulner-
able groups in a range of countries and settings, with an 
accumulating health debt from loss of income, food inse-
curity, solitude and dying alone, mental health problems 
and discontinuity of preventive, promotive and curative 
care for other health conditions.1 This is particularly so 
when measures are prolonged, neglect lived realities, 
disproportionately target disadvantaged communities 
and do not provide adequate social protection.
Of significant, immediate concern is the militarisa-
tion and use of ‘war narratives’ that compare COVID-19 
with a battle and relate the pandemic to being at war, 
referring to ‘the enemy’, with calls to ‘save the economy’ 
and essential workers labelled ‘frontline warriors’.6 Mili-
tary capabilities can contribute in mobilising logistics 
and infrastructure. However, in many countries glob-
ally, state security forces and not public health workers 
or local law enforcement personnel have been deployed 
to communities to contain the spread of COVID-19.1 6–8 
Military personnel deployed in communities respond to 
non- compliance with force, notwithstanding the diffi-
culties that many, including migrant workers, street 
vendors, homeless people and others have with imposed 
measures.1 8 9 From diverse regions globally, there have 
been multiple reports of abuse by police or military 
power for curfew or lockdown violations, in terms of mass 
forced evictions, arrests, killing and deaths in custody.1 7 
For instance, South Africa recorded 230 000 arrests and 
11 deaths by security forces between March and April 
during its lockdown,7 and in recent months UN agen-
cies report hundreds of thousands of people arrested for 
COVID-19 in a range of countries globally.1
Such militarised responses to COVID-19 are under-
pinned by a biosecurity- focused and authoritarian 
approach, with drastic and speedy impositions often 
carried out by security apparatuses that do not inform 
the public in a timely and transparent manner. This is 
comparable to the actions that governments take during 
wartime, ignoring the crucial role that an informed public 
can play in securing effective responses to public health 
threats. COVID-19 was declared a national emergency in 
many countries, following WHO’s naming COVID-19 as 
a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, as 
defined in the 2005 IHR. However, this has then been used 
to apply wide- ranging emergency laws and centralised 
executive power over local devolved action in different 
high, middle and low- income settings.9 Such actions have 
often been made without clear, relevant public informa-
tion on the scientific justification or exit strategy, often 
without engaging local residents or their representatives 
and without consideration of the feasibility of measures, 
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such as in demanding physical distancing in overcrowded 
slums.2 Private companies and governments have intro-
duced the monitoring of people’s movements through 
satellite and mobile telephone platforms in many parts of 
the world, often using emergency powers to limit privacy 
and other rights.10 Such practices raise concern over how 
temporary, necessary and proportionate this surveillance 
is and of how the pandemic is being used to advance 
radical changes in how we interact with digital health 
technologies without considering the future implications 
of vast amounts of health data being stored by entities 
that are often not under public control.10
Military responses in global health signal the deeper 
legacy of both colonialism and coercive medicine, added 
to in recent decades by a perception in security agencies 
that epidemics pose a threat to economic interests and 
political stability.11 HIV and Ebola were both identified 
by the UN as threats to peace and security, and militaries 
deployed in communities in the 2014 Ebola outbreak in 
West Africa.11 A militarised biosecurity response is thus 
not unique to COVID-19. However, side- lining the exper-
tise of health ministries, public health personnel and 
communities by locating the management of COVID-19 in 
centralised security sectors with weak public health experi-
ence fundamentally changes the nature of the response.8 It 
can divert resources to defence sectors or reactive, coercive 
and fear- promoting responses and away from the complex 
adaptive systems needed for effective and sustained public 
health interventions like test, trace and protect.8 The mili-
tary response to the 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic in West 
Africa is estimated to have cost three times the amount 
that would have been needed to set up a well- functioning 
health system infrastructure.11
Militarised, overcentralised, biosecurity approaches 
undermine social cohesion and solidarity, encourage scape-
goating and expand a pejorative discourse on migrants, 
refugees, minorities and others as ‘threats’ in the spread 
of the pandemic, enabling discrimination.12 This approach 
can reinforce a recent far- right, authoritarian and nation-
alist tendency in politics, associated with polarisation, popu-
lism and racism, playing out in different ways in different 
regions.13 Organising public health responses in this way 
can foment discrimination, even unwittingly, and under-
mine long- term social trust in the field.
In demanding obedience to command, rather than 
solidarity and informed action, and using criminal law 
to enforce behaviour change, these measures disem-
power and alienate communities from their central role 
in COVID-19 containment, paradoxically weakening 
adherence to behavioural measures.1 Technical biose-
curity responses and incorrect learning from failures—
including not learning from previous epidemics—risk 
undermining the values, rights and knowledge that effec-
tive public health depends on. Not listening to commu-
nities and front- line workers can lead to unworkable 
harsher restrictions on certain groups that contribute 
to widening inequality. For example, stay- home curfews 
deprive informal workers of livelihoods, while only higher 
income groups can take advantage of remote working 
or home schooling. Imposed measures and unclear, 
delayed and conflicting information build fear, anger, 
mistrust and mental health concerns and can drive social 
behaviours underground, making effective responses 
more difficult.1 8 Ignoring realities on the ground gener-
ates a growing health debt, as people with other condi-
tions do not seek or get adequate care. Such responses 
potentially harm the relationship between communities 
and the state that contribute to public health, and exac-
erbate determinants of poor health, such as increased 
gender violence during lockdowns, prolonged exclusion 
of schooling, affecting mostly lower income children, 
and food and income insecurity.14 These consequences 
can undermine support for effective measures and can 
be highly counterproductive to containing a pandemic 
or its longer term health impacts.
Oversimplifying, scapegoating and restructuring public 
health responses have also shifted funds and institutional 
authority to large private, corporate actors and public 
health to national biosecurity institutions.15 16 Reor-
ganising national public health bodies and selectively 
dismissing public health evidence without consulting 
experts and personnel can be wasteful, demoralising and 
counterproductive. While privatisation and commod-
ification of public health systems are not new, the 
pandemic has provided an opportunity to intensify it 
in some settings, in contrast to approaches that coordi-
nate private sector action under public sector leadership. 
Justifying these changes as necessary during an emer-
gency places a smokescreen over the manner in which 
longer term austerity and privatisation may themselves 
undermine the opportunity for an effective public health 
response.16 Ignoring reminders from the WHO that the 
pandemic risk remains until all are protected, a sense 
of threat and self- protection has led to the inequitable 
stockpiling of essential health technologies and vaccine 
nationalism in high- income countries, undermining the 
international risk prevention and solidarity intended in 
the 2005 IHR.4 17 Emergency laws enabling a biosecurity 
approach have altered checks and balances on execu-
tives of government, enabling millions of dollars raised 
internationally or mobilised from public revenue to be 
applied without adequate parliamentary or public scru-
tiny, even while large sections of the population struggle 
to survive and face mental health crises with the loss of 
income under lockdowns.9
ADVANCING A COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE
Biosecurity is not equal to public health. ‘Public health is 
the science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life 
and promoting health through the organized efforts of 
society’18 (p 2). It is implemented through participation, 
the organised efforts and informed choices of society, 
state and non- state organisations. It acts on the social 
determinants of health and health equity from proximal 
to structural levels, through the organisation of policies, 
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services and social measures to ensure and improve the 
conditions and capacities for health and well- being for 
all. We cannot allow the response to COVID-19 to reduce 
public health in institutional practice and in the public 
mind to biosecurity alone, treating people as objects 
not agents, undermining knowledge, equity, rights and 
decades of prior work. We need to protect and advance 
a public health that is rooted in public interest and in 
the public; that is proactive, effective, participatory, prin-
cipled, just, based on scientific and social evidence; that 
acts upstream on the social determinants of health and 
that builds cooperation between health, other sectors 
and communities and between countries globally.
Doing this starts with a different relationship with the 
local level and communities, as a matter of rights and 
justice and for public health effectiveness. Local organi-
sation, health literacy, local leadership, ideas, innovations 
and action are all necessary to prevent infection and 
provide social protection and care. They are core for an 
effective public health response.1 2 17 There are many exam-
ples of affirmative community involvement in the response 
to COVID-19 from all regions globally.1 19–21 They show 
alternatives in social action and collaborations between 
communities and states that contrast with inappropriate 
and overcentralised biosecurity responses. As we enter the 
sixth month of the declaration of this pandemic, we would 
do better to dialogue, work with and respect the public and 
diverse professionals, sharing knowledge and information 
to understand and act on risk.
We need to protect an ethical, scientific and rights- 
based approach to public health, such as the UN Siracusa 
principles shown in box 1.22
Like all rights- based approaches, such principles 
come alive when known, implemented and upheld by 
all in a manner that builds collective power, rather than 
dominating power. The principles are subject to inter-
pretation. Decisions made in the ‘public good’ need, 
therefore, to be probed for the technical knowledge, 
evidence, consultation and sociopolitical interests and 
power that inform them and the measures included for 
accountability and learning from action. The evidence 
applied needs to include the full range of systematically 
organised knowledge, including from implementers and 
from communities’ lived experiences. In contrast to a 
self- protective response, health as a human right needs to 
be understood and implemented as a collective responsi-
bility, within countries and globally.1
‘Health actors, community leaders and communities 
must co- construct options for COVID-19 response that 
are acceptable, and feasible, and foster commitment of 
affected communities’21 (p 2). In part, doing this implies 
proactive design of measures through decentralised 
governance and deeper, more nuanced engagement 
with local health and social service professionals, local 
authorities, civil society organisations and different social 
groups, including marginalised communities and youth. 
This type of engagement helps to interpret and locally 
adapt guidance to effectively implement key responses, 
including testing, tracing and protecting people; 
preventing and controlling outbreaks and supporting 
vulnerable groups. It also calls for significantly better, 
honest communication in appropriate messages for 
diverse needs, with health literacy outreach to build 
informed action and accountability. It calls for timely 
warning of outbreak control measures and of support 
and exit strategies. It demands explicit attention to 
equity, non- discrimination and to implementing public 
health measures in ways that build trust and combat 
stigma, racism and xenophobia. We do not have a blank 
slate on this. We have drawn learning from the response 
to HIV, where those affected themselves challenged 
silence, neglect and stigma and cocreated collaborative 
action; from ‘bottom- up’ responses to Ebola in Africa1 21 
and from the many positive experiences in the responses 
emerging to COVID-19 noted earlier that provide valu-
able learning for public health.1 17 19 20
CONCLUSION: CHOOSING A COMPREHENSIVE, PARTICIPATORY 
PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH
COVID-19 will be with us for the longer term. It will not 
be the last pandemic. We do not need to and should not 
coerce, terrify, fatigue, undermine and harm public trust 
and public health systems in our response. We need a 
public health response that generates communication, 
understanding, learning, capabilities, civil responsibility, 
local innovations and global solidarity. COVID-19 has 
stimulated an extraordinary mobilisation of response in 
a short time. It provides an opportunity to learn, reflect 
on and build an effective form of public health to meet 
a 21st century that is facing multiple crises including 
future pandemics, climate, food, energy, precarious 
Box 1 The United Nations (UN) Economic and Social 
Council in its 1984 Siracusa principles
The UN Economic and Social Council in its 1984 Siracusa principles 
guide the state to exercise its powers for measures that restrict 
individual freedoms in a manner that:
1. Is carried out in accordance with the law.
2. Has clear public health purpose to improve or sustain public health 
by accomplishing essential public health services and functions, as 
a legitimate objective of general interest.
3. Is based on scientific evidence and not drafted or imposed arbitrarily.
4. Is strictly necessary in a democratic society to achieve the objective.
5. Is well targeted, through the least restrictive alternative, not apply-
ing to more individuals than is necessary for the public’s health, and 
given that there are no less intrusive and restrictive means available 
to reach the same objective.
6. Is based on the precautionary principle.
7. Includes ongoing public health education and outreach to encour-
age, facilitate and promote community participation in accomplish-
ing public health goals.
8. Is respectful of human dignity, and not discriminate unlawfully 
against individuals.
9. Is of a limited duration and subject to review.22
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labour, grotesque and growing social inequality, conflict 
and other threats. In as much as there has been a histor-
ical trend towards centralised, authoritarian biosecurity 
responses, there have also been contesting movements 
towards a comprehensive, social determinant, participa-
tory and justice- driven public health, in different regions 
and countries and globally. Let us reclaim, support, invest 
in and implement this latter version of public health.
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